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Near the beginning of his recent book, The Tempting of America,
Robert Bork evokes what for him is a "disturbing" image:
My [judicial] chambers . . . were on the third floor of the
United States Courthouse and overlooked Constitution Avenue.
Twice a year... I watched massive marches come down that wide
street, one by anti-abortionists and one by pro-abortionists ....
[T]he demonstrators march past the Houses of Congress with
hardly a glance and go straight to the Supreme Court building to
make their moral sentiments known where they perceive those sen-
timents to be relevant.'
To Bork these demonstrations are evidence that many Americans are
coming to accept what he calls the "major heresy" that judges are not
bound by law.2
No matter what you or I may think of the rest of Bork's legal
philosophy, this picture of direct political pressure on the Court must
cause all of us to pause. At the most elementary and important level,
we pause because we believe that, whatever a lawsuit should be, it
should not be a plebiscite or a lynching.3 At a more rarified level, we
suspect that direct political pressure is inconsistent with judicial re-
view itself, for in one way or another most theories of judicial review
turn on the belief that judges have something unique to contribute to
public decisionmaking and that the nature of this contribution is
* Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. This paper was
presented as part of the Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Constitutional Law Conference at the University of
Colorado on April 13, 1990.
1. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 3 (1990).
2. Id. at 4-11.
3. Perhaps, the idea that a judge may react to political influences is threatening even when the
circumstances are benign, the judicial role and function are identifiable precisely by virtue of legal
formalities and their limitations, so neither an unconstrained doer-of-good nor a broadly responsive
wise-person would be recognizable as a "judge." See J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 84-89
(1973). Thus, it might be thought that political influence of most kinds is to be resisted because such
pressures are usually manifested outside the courtroom and are not properly presented as evidence or in
briefs. However, the kinds of influence to be discussed in this paper (including current political events,
statutory trends, and positions taken by professional organizations) can be-and are-assimilated into
such normal legal forms as amicus briefs, judicial notice, and so on.
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closely tied to political insulation.4 These theories emphasize different
virtues-the capacity to remain faithful to constitutional text, or to
apply law neutrally, or to protect minority participation in the demo-
cratic process, or to develop coherent moral precepts-but they all
have significant appeal and they are all put at risk by direct political
pressure.
If he is right about nothing else, then, Bork is right that it is dis-
turbing to imagine our law being made in response to clamor in the
streets. This concern crosses the ideological and jurisprudential spec-
trum. It is, for example, common ground even for such disparate
figures as Justices Blackmun and Scalia.
Recall that Blackmun, the author and staunch defender of Roe v.
Wade,5 started that opinion by writing that the judicial task was "to
resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and
of predilection." 6 He assured us, "[W]e seek earnestly to do this
•. .,,7 More recently, in condemning legislative efforts to thwart or
limit the right to abortion, Blackmun alluded to the history of massive
resistance to desegregation in the South and affirmed that "[a]s judges
... we are sworn to uphold the law even when its content gives rise to
bitter dispute."8 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,9 Justice
Scalia, who is perhaps the sharpest judicial critic of the right to abor-
tion, lamented the Court's failure to overrule Roe v. Wade and
charged that postponement of an authoritative decision "distorts the
public perception of the role of this Court."'" Scalia continued:
4. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (fidelity to text); Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles ofConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (neutrality); J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (participation); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); M.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988) (moral precepts).
5. 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
6. Id.
7. Id. It is not entirely clear what Blackmun was including as "emotion and predilection" in
contrast to "constitutional measurement." His two preceding paragraphs seem to suggest that they
include virtually all sources of personal beliefs about morality and policy:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the
deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's
experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training,
one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one estab-
lishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and con-
clusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to com-
plicate and not to simplify the problem.
410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
8. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759, 771
(1986).
9. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
10. Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full
of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging
us-their unelected and-. life-tenured judges who have been
awarded those extraordinary, undemocratic characteristics pre-
cisely in order that we might follow the law despite the popular
will-to follow the popular will.'1
It is entirely natural that judges, even if they are as different as
Blackmun and Scalia, should resent -political pressure on the courts.
But this common position begins to seem more puzzling when you
recognize that, even as they decry demonstrations and resistance, the
Justices try to provoke and control political reaction to judicial
decisions.
Consider Justice Blackmun. We can take him at his word that his
effort is to decide the abortion issue "free of emotion" and independ-
ent of "bitter" public disputes. But listen to these extraordinarily im-
passioned and revealing passages from his dissenting opinion in
Webster:
Never in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment
... that so foments disregard for the law ....
Nor in my memory has a plurality gone about its business in
such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review. . .'the plu-
rality obscures the portent of its analysis. .. . The ... opinion is
filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who
would do away with Roe ....
I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years
since Roe was decided. .
It is impossible to read the plurality opinion . without recogniz-
ing its implicit invitation to' every State to enact more and more
restrictive abortion laws ....
Thus, "not with a bang but a whimper," the pluralitydiscards
a landmark case.., and casts into darkness the hopes and visions
of every woman in this country. ... The plurality would clear the
way again for the State to conscript a Woman's body.
Of the aspirations and settled understandings of American
women, of the inevitable and brutal consequences of what it is do-
ing, the plurality ... utters not a word. This silence is callous.
11. Id. at 3065-66.
1990]
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[T]he plurality invites charges of cowardice and illegitimacy to our
door. I cannot say that these would be undeserved.
For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed.
For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to con-
trol their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous,
and a chill wind blows. 1
2
Notice that Blackmun accuses the plurality of inviting the enactment
of restrictive abortion laws even though the plurality opinion bears
only in very limited and indirect ways on the wisdom or desirability of
such legislation. ' 3 Notice that Blackmun writes as if the plurality had
utterly abandoned Roe and had decided to approve even the harshest
restrictions on abortion even though the plurality itself expressly re-
jects both positions.' 4 Notice, finally, that Blackmun refers repeatedly
to women as a unitary group-"Anerican women" and "the women
of this Nation"-and speaks in the most incendiary terms of their lib-
erties, their interests, and their bodies. It is,. I submit, impossible to
read his opinion in Webster without recognizing that Justice Black-
mun is not primarily addressing his colleagues on the bench. He -is
addressing women in the general public and his intent is to convince
them that the plurality opinion should be read in the most ominous
possible way. Why would he do this if not to arouse a political reac-
tion to Webster? No wonder Scalia fears those carts of mail.
Now, I do not want to be. misunderstood here. I think it is an
arresting fact that a highly conscientious judge can-with respect to a
single important issue like abortion-bitterly criticize political pres-
sure on the Court and also make transparent efforts to mobilize that
pressure. But this fact is not grounds for any special criticism of Jus-
tice Blackmun.
Consider Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Texas v. John-
son, 5 the case that created a first amendment right to burn an Ameri-
12. Id. at 3067, 3077, 3078, 3079 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13. The plurality does say, "[W]e do- not see why the State's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability." Id. at 3057. It is, however,
logically possible to deny the significance of viability and still oppose aboition limitations, including
limitations in the third trimester. On the issue whether limitations should be permitted earlier than
viability, the plurality says only that the mandated viability test "permissibly furthers the State's inter-
est in protecting. potential human life." Id The plurality admits that the requirement increases the
costs of abortions and affects the physicians' determination of viability, but notes that the tests are
"reasonably designed to ensure that abortions are not performed where the fetus is viable-an end
which all concede is legitimate .... ." Id. at 3058.
14. The plurality denies that legislative bodies "in a Nation where more than half of our popula-
tion is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion regulation reminiscent of
the dark ages .... Id.
15. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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can flag. In the past, Rehnquist, like Blackmun, has strongly resisted
the notion that constitutional interpretation should be based on public
opinion and political influence.16 But in Johnson Rehnquist protested
the majority's holding by quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Concord
Hymn," Francis Scott Key's "Star Spangled Banner" and John
Greenleaf Whittier's poem, "Barbara Frietchie." He rehearsed bits of
American military history with references to the American Revolu-
tion, to hand-to-hand combat at Iwo Jima, and to the landing at In-
chon. Think what you will of Rehnquist's dissent, I do not believe it
was addressed primarily to lawyers. As is also true of Blackmun's
opinion in Webster, the natural and predictable effect of the kind of
rhetoric used by Rehnquist is to foment political opposition to a judi-
cial decision. In the case of flag desecration, that opposition has ap-
peared in the form of outraged editorials, a new federal statute, and
talk of a constitutional amendment. In the case of abortion rights, the
opposition can be seen in exaggerated newspaper accounts of the
meaning of Webster, in an outpouring of political support for organi-
zations and candidates committed to abortion rights, and in a pro-
posed federal statute codifying Roe v. Wade. It is against the
background of all this political activity that the Court will soon be
reconsidering its position on both flag desecration and abortion. 7
I doubt that Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist were oblivious to
the incendiary qualities in their respective opinions. Whether they
specifically intended to provoke marches or to affect the kind of mail
delivered to the Justices, of course, no one can say with complete cer-
tainty. Normally, however, people are assumed to intend the natural
consequences of their actions.
Let us assume that the Justices intended only to influence public
opinion generally-that they were simply attempting to be persuasive
before the broad audience of the American public. Unless the mem-
bers of the Court are impervious to the views of American citizens,
this attempt is, in effect, also an effort to influence subsequent judicial
deliberations. I will return soon to the question whether it makes
sense to distinguish between specific forms of pressure, like marches
down Constitution Avenue, and diffuse forms of pressure, like general
public opinion. But now my point is a limited one: Justices as differ-
ent as Blackmun and Rehnquist write opinions in a Way designed to
affect the amount and type of political activity directed at the Court
16. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
17. On June 11, 1990, the Court extended its decision in Johnson and struck down the Flag
Protection Act of 1989. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
1990]
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even while believing that the Court should not be affected by external
pressure.
Opinions that speak of "cast[ing] into darkness the hopes and -vi-
sions of every woman in this country" or that quote "Barbara
Frietchie" may be-uinusual, but fomenting political pressure on the'ju-
diciary is an unavoidable part of judging. Every idea, Holmes said, is
an incitement: Every persuasive opinion necessarily helps to shape the
political climate, which in turn shapes the Court's deliberations. The
fact that Brown v. Board of Education 18 was a unanimous opinion (or
that Cooper v. Aaron 9 Was individually signed by each Justice) re-
duced some political pressures and. increased others; Even a tightly
reasoned, legally powerful dissent-say Justice Brennan's in National
League of Cities v. Usery2°-will encourage vehement academic com-
mentary. Law review articles are-not marches, but the dominant opin-
ion in academia, like general public opinion, is a form of pressure on
the'Court and can help to induce the Court to, change direction.2
The issue, then, -is not whether the Justices should write in ways
that have the effect of altering the constellation of social and political
pressures on the Court. They cannot avoid doing so. Nor is the ques-
tion whether they should intend these pressures to influence judicial
deliberations. They can avoid this intent only by convincing them-
selves-against considerable historical evidence, not to mention an ele-
mentary understanding of human nature-that judges are not
influenced by such pressures. The issue is whether the kinds.of pres-
sures so often condemned (such as marches and bags of mail) are sig-
nificantly different from the kinds of pressures usually tolerated or
approved (say, widespread political consensus or the opinions of the
Harvard law faculty).
II.
As a way to begin considering this question, let us return for a
moment to Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v.. Wade. Remember
that he began with the statement .that the Court was earnestly trying
to avoid emotion and predilection, to decide "by constitutional mea-
surement." Those sentences are directly followed, not by any refer-
ences to constitutional principles or text, but by this' statement:
"[B]ecause we do [earnestly seek to avoid non-constitutional influ-
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)..
19. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
21. When the Court repudiated Usery, it relied in part on academic writings that had been critical
of that decision. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n. 1 (1985).
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ences], we have inquired into, and . . . place some emphasis upon,
medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about
man's attitude toward the' abortion procedure over the centuries."22
And, indeed, the pages immediately following'deal with the beliefs of
the Greeks and Romans about abortion, the meaning of the Hippo-
cratic Oath, the history of both English -and American positive law,
and the positions' of the American Medical Association, the American
Public Health Association, and the American -Bar Association. I
count some twenty-three pages of such material before the Constitu-
tion is again mentioned (and then only to concede that its text does not
mention 'a right to privacy).23 Those twenty-three pages are an effort,
according, to Blackmun's words, to avoid extraneous influences, to find
some constitutional measurement.
Now, once again, I'am not criticizing Blackmun; he is not unique
in his claims about what is relevant to constitutional "measurement."
On the contrary, every member of the present Supreme Court sub-
scribes to the view that political and moral traditions are relevant to
defining constitutional rights.24 'But this wide consensus presents a
perplexing question: no matter how they are derived and defined, why
are such traditions more appropriate vehicles for measuring the Con-
stitution than are marches down Constitution Ayenue? At first
glance, the kinds of sources we are talking about--common law prin-
ciples, philosophical and religious writings, policy recommendations
of professional groups-are simply individual or collective opinions
about correct public policy. That is precisely what is carried on the
mail cart to the Justices, and it is precisely.what is manifested by polit-
ical demonstrations in the streets. In fact,' opinions that we usually
dismiss as "political influence" have the advantages of being current
and strongly-held. The opinions that we dignify with the word "tradi-
tion" are often outdated and faded. 'At the'very least, one would think
that if the opinions of the Romans or the early history of state abor-
tion laws are relevant to constitutional measurement, current views
should be too.
It is at a point like this that jurists and academics usually start
making distinctions, but I find it hard to locate any that are especially
22.- Roe v. Wade,'410 U.S. at 116-17.
23. I at 152 ("The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy").
24. Even Juiice Rehnquist, dissenting in Roe, expressed admiration for the sweep of Blackmun's
opinion and countered with his own interpretation of our traditions..410U. at 171, 174-77. In a
more recent case, Justice Scalia presented the most restrictive current view of constitutional authority,
and his position is that political and moral traditions are relevant and ippropnate to defining the right
to privacy if they 'are conceptualized at their narrowest level of abstraction. Only Justice Rehnquist
joined in this proposed limitation. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct.'2333, 2344 n.6 (1989).
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helpful. The most obvious distinction turns on the relevance of the
type of opinion expressed.
Substantive relevance: It might be thought that a consensus of
respected scholars on a legal question should influence the Court's de-
liberations but that the chanted slogans of marching feminists or the
bottles containing fetuses held out by pro-life demonstrators should
not. This kind of distinction seems intuitively strong to many people,
but these intuitions depend on implicit and controversial theories
about appropriate sources of constitutional meaning. In the days
before law faculties turned so much of their attention to Wittgenstein
and Habermas, academic opinion might have been thought relevant
under a theory holding that the Constitution should be interpreted ac-
cording to a rigorous application of legal precedents or historical evi-
dence as to the intent of the framers. Since Justice Blackmun's
constitutional interpretation in Roe relies on the positions of the AMA
and the vicissitudes of state regulation, it is clear that he, at least, does
not adopt any such restrictive theory of constitutional meaning.
It is difficult to see why the technical knowledge held by the med-
ical profession is relevant to establishing constitutional meaning but
not the chants of women who have been patients or the direct observa-
tion of a fetus in a bottle. There is reason to think, in fact, that Black-
mun does think that information about raw events is relevant; he may
well believe, for example, that seeing an individual in a permanent veg-
etative state is important to deciding the issue whether there is a con-
stitutional right to die.25 If constitutional law is supposed to represent
profound public morality, as many now claim, I cannot see any reason
why Justice Blackmun is not right if he does believe that emotional
reactions to direct observation of the subject matter are relevant. I
doubt, for example, that a decision about the morality of the death
penalty would be fully informed without seeing an execution carried
out. Demonstrations on Constitution Avenue are proxies for direct
25. At the end of the State of Missouri's oral argument in Cruzan v. Director of the Missouri
Department of Health, 258 U.S.L.W. 4916 (1990), Justice Blackmun initiated the following exchange:
Question: Mr. Presson, before you sit down, I'd like to ask a-an impertinent and perhaps
an improper question. Have you ever seen a patient in a persistent vegetative
state?
Answer: I have seen Nancy Cruzan herself.





Answer: I was at the hospital, at Mount Vernon Rehabilitation Center.
Official Transcript at 44, Cruzan v. Director Mo. Dep't of Health, 258 U.S.L.W. 4916 (1990) (No. 88-
1503).
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observation. The angry, fervent marchers with their bullhorns and
their placards are telling the Justices how it felt -to them to observe and
experience abortion policy in action.
Perhaps it is wrong to think that constitutional law should repre-
sent judgments about the morality, and wisdom of various public poli-
cies, but I know of no one, including Judge Bork, who will argue that
such factors should be excluded. It is mysterious to me that there can
be such broad agreement on this point and yet. we. can still find wide-
spread hostility to the idea that judges should note and be duly influ-
enced by street demonstrations.
Pressure and persuasion: Even if it is true that the kinds of exper-
iences communicated by political demonstrations are often relevant to
the moral decisionmaking that.is now a part of constitutional interpre-
tation, it might be that there is an identifiable type of influence-sug-
gested by the very word "pressure"-that is irrelevant under widely
shared assumptions about appropriate sources for constitutional law.
There is a difference, one would think, between demonstrations or let-
ters that seek to persuade (even if on the basis of emotion or raw expe-
rience or some other unconventional argument) and influence that
does not depend on any argument about appropriate legal meaning.
Thus, a threat on .a judge's life seems to make no claim of any kind
about the proper content of the Constitution; its message is, "Rule my
way no matter what the law should require because, otherwise, I will
harm you." As latitudinous as the standards for deriving constitu-
tional meaning have become, there is still a consensus that physical
threats are not relevant to interpretation. It might be that this consen-
sus extends to a more general principle: influence that does not depend
on persuasive force is inappropriate.26 For example, astreet demon-
stration might be labeled "pressure" to the extent that its message is,
"Rule our way because there are many of us" or "Rule -our way be-
cause we are important people."
Since most .efforts at influencing the Court incorporate at least
some form of legal or moral argument-no matter if abbreviated or
crude-this distinction between "pressure" and "persuasion" rules out
very little. Moreover, even when there is no express argument about
law or morality, there can be implicit argumentation. The size of the
crowd that masses together on Constitution Avenue is itself an argu-
ment unless it is irrelevant to moral decisions how many people share
a certain ethical position.. (It is hard to see whiy in due process cases it
is thought to be important how widespread a tradition is and how long
26. Although I am not sure I have done justice to his point, I am indebted to Kent Greenawalt for
posing this distinction. "
1990]
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it has been entrenched, except on the assumption that the extent of
agreement is an appropriate consideration.) The identity of the protes-
tors can also be relevant unless moral advice from a group of liars or
criminals should be as weighty as the opinions of right-living citizens.
(Perhaps some judgment of this sort lay behind Blackmun's reliance in
Roe on the opinions of professionally respectable groups such as the
AMA and the ABA.) Indeed, even physical threats can amount to
moral arguments unless a fervently-held position is entitled to no more
moral weight than a lukewarm belief. Certainly the willingness of civil
rights protestors to break the law during the 1960s attested to the seri-
ousness of their ethical claims. To say that political pressures contain
implicit constitutional arguments is not to say that all such pressures
ought to be acceded to; sometimes the impolite or garbled or threaten-
ing arguments made in the streets ought to be ignored. They should
be ignored if they are poor arguments or destructive arguments-but
the word "pressure" ought not blind us to whatever persuasive ele-
ments do exist.
Formal authority: A third distinction turns on the amount of for-
mal authority represented by those who would pressure the courts. At
the high end of this scale would be political influence expressed in
constitutional amendments or in the nomination and confirmation of
federal judges. In both of these instances a formal governmental
mechanism allows for political influence over the courts. Lower on
the scale would be the enactment of federal statutes and the exercise of
presidential vetoes. Lower yet might be state statutes, the common
law and so on. Political influence expressed in these and other ways
may or may not be relevant to establishing "correct" constitutional
meaning, but such influence is at least authorized in some degree.
Hence the Court sometimes defers to congressional judgments on how
to enforce the equal protection clause and to state legislative judg-
ments on the justification for various policies that infringe rights; in-
deed, the Court goes so far as to look to established patterns in state
statutory and common' law to define individual rights under the due
process clause.27 By way of contrast, letters to judges and marches in
the streets can be described as the actions of private individuals who
have no authority to shape our positive law.
This distinction does not explain either observed behavior or felt
intuitions any better thap the distinctions based on substantive rele-
vance. In Roe Justice Blackmun, for instance, relied on resolutions
and positions of the ABA and the AMA, although those groups are
27. See supra note 24.
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not authorized to make law, while in Thornburgh 28 he bitterly de-
nounced the actions of various state legislatures in establishing restric-
tive abortion policies. Moreover, even if Blackmun and other judges
consistently honored the formal authority of other governmental insti-
tutions, it would not follow that they should ignore non-governmental
sources of opinion. Although private individuals and informal groups
are not authorized to establish legal meaning, this lack of authority
does not necessarily disqualify them from influencing the formal
mechanisms that do establish the positive law. Public opinion appro-
priately affects, for instance, the judgment of Senators on whether
Bork should sit on the Supreme Court; why should that same opinion,
insofar as it relates to issues like judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights, not also be heard by the sitting Justices?
Informal authority: A fourth distinction emphasizes informal au-
thority. I am referring to the quality of the decisionmaking process
that underlies a particular form of influence. Some theorists have pro-
posed, for instance, that the Court should defer to state legislative en-
actments when there is evidence of public-spirited deliberation,29 and
it may be that public opinion expressed during the Bork hearings
should be permitted to affect the Court because those opinions were
qualified and transformed in a responsible, thorough public hearing.3°
Informal and formal authority sometimes track one another, but
not always. Perhaps in Roe Justice Blackmun listened to the positions
taken by organizations like the AMA, which have no formal author-
ity, because they are large and provide opportunities for full and in-
formed debate. In contrast, street demonstrations often reflect
relatively unorganized and sudden expressions of opinion; letters rep-
resent only the views of single individuals who may be writing without
careful thought or consultation.
It is even sometimes suggested that informal authority can make
up for irregularity and illegality. Thus Professor Ackerman has pro-
posed that the legislative innovations of the New Deal have the force
of a constitutional amendment (and thus should greatly influence judi-
cial decisions) even though Roosevelt never proposed any amend-
ments and did not even successfully pack the Court.31 For Ackerman,
the massive, mobilized political consensus that developed around the
need for affirmative, regulatory government carries its own informal
28. 476 U.S. at 771.
29. Eg., Sunstein, Interest Groups and American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 78-87 (1985).
30. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has praised those hearings as being "often of extremely high
quality ... and . . . sometimes ... of academic depth and rigor ... an extended seminar on the
Constitution." Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Dec. 17, 1987, at 36, 38.
31. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 511-15 (1989).
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moral and political authority. Similarly, he argues that the fourteenth
amendment should heavily influence judicial interpretations despite
the fact that the lawful processes of amendment were significantly
abused.32 He claims that the legal force of that amendment arises
from the extraordinary nature of the public debate, from the trans-
formative power of focused and inspired public opinion.
One problem with the distinction based on informal authority is
that it is likely to be wildly inaccurate. Debate in the ABA may be full
and thoughtful or it may be posed or even fraudulent; a single letter
may reflect a foolish impulse or the most careful internal moral dia-
logue. Moreover, the same decisionmaking process can be complex
enough to justify very different characterizations. Ackerman empha-
sizes how the Civil War Amendments resulted from deep intellectual
and moral deliberations, but they also resulted from (as he acknowl-
edges) brute military and political force. To shift the example a great
deal, law review articles might be given low weight because they are
typically written by cloistered eccentrics and edited by inexperienced
students. But they also can be characterized as the product of a fo-
cused, thoughtful collegial discourse. Given the room for error and
choice in characterization, emphasis on informal authority is treacher-
ous. To some degree, it inevitably reflects judgments about how cor-
rect, not how deliberative, a form of political pressure is. Justice
Blackmun, being only human, is inclined to reject the informal author-
ity of state legislatures that oppose his conclusions about abortion; he
sees their decisions, like armed resistance to desegregation, as illegiti-
mate expressions of emotion and hostility. On the other hand, I sus-
pect he welcomes massive demonstrations by advocates of freedom of
choice.
This inconsistency accurately captures the confused and ambiva-
lent state of our attitudes toward political pressure on the courts to-
day. We have a jurisprudential mythology that is opposed to outside
influence and can be trotted out whenever a political message is disa-
greeable. Pro-choice people flinch at the thought of the Justices being
influenced by those bottles holding fetuses and Justice Blackmun rails
against state legislative resistance to Roe. On the other hand, some
pro-life people claim that feminists shouldn't be marching down Con-
necticut Avenue and Justice Scalia worries about the mail he will be
receiving after Webster. But the fact is, I suggest, that despite our
selective disclaimers and our occasional genuflections to traditional ju-
risprudence, just about everyone believes that marches, demonstra-
tions, boycotts, and even armed conflict should affect judicial
32. Id. at 500-10.
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decisionmaking. We know that Brown v. Board of Education,33 Cooper
v. Aaron,34 Shelly v. Kraemer,35 New York Times v. Sullivan 36 and the
other monumental decisions of the Civil Rights era were not decided
by judges oblivious to the people in the streets.37 I think that there is
no avoiding the conclusion that under the surface most of us believe
that judges should be influenced by political pressures. And, once we
admit that some political reactions should at least be noticed and eval-
uated by judges, there does not seem to be any satisfactory way to
define the kinds of pressures that are appropriate and those that are
not.
True, judicial review, if predicated on political insulation, is
threatened by this admission. But there can still be a distinctively
legal function if the processes of adjudication or the acculturation of
lawyers can be expected to transform those political influences so that
the judiciary produces decisions that are uniquely valuable.38 Under
such a view, however, political pressures ought not to be deprecated
on a selective basis. If all such pressures are accepted as legitimate
efforts to influence, then the ways that the legal culture improves on
those politically-expressed values, if it does improve on them, can be
honestly assessed.
III.
Even if you do not agree entirely, assume with me for a moment
that political pressures of almost every conceivable variety ought to be
regarded as legitimate attempts to influence constitutional decision-
making by the courts, at least if the judicial function is to include set-
ting wise and moral public policies. I want now to suggest what
follows if this is true. What follows from the propriety of political
pressure on the judiciary is that the absence of pressure should also
influence the courts. In short, I want to end this talk by suggesting
that ordinary behavior has as much claim to constitutional signifi-
cance as does overt political pressure.
The comparison I want to make now is between what I will call
mute behavior and what I will call articulate pressure. Articulate
pressures include all the kinds of activities I have been discussing so
far-not only marches down Constitution Avenue and mail to the Jus-
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
35. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
36. 276 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. For one excellent account, see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
38. For a recent argument for such a possibility, see M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW
(1988).
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tices, but also the great political mobilization that resulted in the New
Deal and the small mobilization that occurs when a judge has tea in
the Harvard faculty lounge and learns what those professors smirk at
and what they take seriously. In each instance, some person or group
has considered some issue and attempts to bring an opinion or prefer-
ence before the judge. Mute behavior is the opposite. It exists when it
hasn't occurred to anyone to articulate an opinion, let alone to bring
that opinion to bear on a judge. If, for example, in two hundred years
no one has thought to abolish or dramatically alter states as gover-
mental organizations, the resulting institutional patterns are what I
mean by mute behavior. If for many generations it never dawns on
anyone to use humiliation in the stocks as punishment, the absence of
that form of punishment is a mute behavior. If until about 1970 no
one imagined that the Constitution protected a right to abortion, that
also is a mute behavior.
Although the kinds of political influence that I have been discuss-
ing up until now are all articulate pressures, it should be obvious that
mute behaviors are a form of political influence as well. When people
do not ask for a change, when they remain silent, they are affecting
governmental decisionmaking. The issue, then, is whether there is
some reason for judges to pay attention when people want something
but to ignore people when they take things for granted, are uninter-
ested, or are content.
By their nature, mute behaviors are not announced or even
clearly understood. But, like articulate pressures, they reflect -human
experience. If the consequences of governmental action or inaction
are acceptable, especially over a long time, the resulting state of affairs
will seem normal and may not even be noticed. Similarly, if the gov-
ernment is urged to undertake some action, the limits established for
action may not be consciously understood, for those limits represent
an implicit consensus about what is tolerable or even desirable in the
existing state of affairs.
°Should judges be influenced by mute behaviors? Much of modern
constitutional theory says that they should not be. For. example, when
Ronald Dworkin argues that the equal protection clause should .be1 in-
terpreted to invalidate distinctions based on prejudice-for example,
legal discriminations against homosexuality-he is arguing, that the
reasons given for adopting the fourteenth amendment should count
more than the fact that the enactors never imagined that'they, were
changing any laws regarding homosexuality.39 Similarly, when Bruce
Ackerman grounds the right to use contraceptives partly in the :New
39. Dworkin, Reagan's Justice, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, No. 8, 1984, at 3.
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Deal's transformation of our concept of property, he is arguing that
affirmative political argument and pressure -regarding centralized eco-
nomic regulation should count more than the fact that those reforms
were not precipitated by any concern about restrictions on sexual be-
havior.' Of more direct importance than theories like those of Dwor-
kin and Ackerman is the fact that the normal interpretive practices of
our judges systematically ignore or down-play significant mute behav-
iors. 1 All the-innovations that we have become so accustomed to-
the discovery in 1972 that sexual privacy is a right that is independent
of the institution of marriage or in 1976 that price advertisements are a
protected form of expression and so on-involve a decision to disre-
gard the weight of established behaviors and implicit understandings.
. One possible justification for crediting affirmative pressures but
not mute behaviors is that affirmative pressures represent conscious
thought and active decisionmaking rather than reflex. 2 To some de-
gree this contrast is a. false one. Individual people can decide not to
raise an issue or propose a change on the basis of private reflection. If
many people-virtually everyone-had long decided not to push for
something (or even to talk about it) so that an issue had not become
public, the resulting inactivity would seem to reflect an emphatic kind
of collective decision. To some degree, however, the contrast is accu-
rate, since nonaction can sometimes represent lack of thought or con-
cern or imagination. But if conditions or events are not unsatisfactory
enough even to inspire thought, the absence of conscious consideration
has strong significance because the resulting inactivity might be a pow-
erful endorsement of the way things are.
hThere is a. deeper problem with the claim that affirmative pres-
sures should be preferred because they represent conscious thought
and active decisionmaking. When jurists and legal theorists focus on
the principle inherent in active politics and ignore what was not con-
sidered, they are not privileging conscious thought in any realistic
sense. Indeed, the whole effect of their "principles" is to get around
the inconvenient fact that, for example, Reconstruction and the New
Deal did not involve consideration of homosexuality or contraceptives.
Assuming that conscious thought is an advantage, the only way to
40. Ackerman, supra note 30, at 536-45.
41. The generality of this practice is evidenced by the fact that on the present Court only Justices
Scalia and Rehnquistargue that traditions used to define constitutional rights should be conceived of as
narrowly as possible. See supra note 24 and infra note 41. It could also, I think, be conclusively and
tediously demonstrated by a compilation of all the important decisions of the last forty years that
invalidated long-ingrained public policies.
42. Cf M. PERRY, supra note 37, at' 121-79 (urging "deliberative, transformative politics").
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know what was consciously thought about is to pay attention to mute
behaviors.43
A second possible justification for crediting affirmative pressures
is that, while mute behavior can represent intellectual activity, it can-
not (by definition) represent dialogue. Under this view, what has not
been talked about is not worthy of the judges' attention. As trendy as
this justification is, ' it is hard to understand. Mute behaviors do not
represent verbal interchange among people or groups, but they do rep-
resent other forms of communication and interaction. The prolonged
non-repeal statutes, or the subtle coordination of expectations whereby
a group senses that they have gone far enough in establishing a new
rule, or the implicit message of approval communicated by satisfied
inattention to an issue-these are all forms of interaction. They are
important even if not verbal. The quiet flow of human conduct is not
necessarily less eloquent than the excited noise of public debate.
CONCLUSION
I want to close by anticipating an obvious objection to the drift of
43. This leads to Justice Scalia's conclusion that privacy rights should be defined by reference to
the narrowest possible conceptualization of the relevant legal/moral tradition. See supra note 24. The
issue is not whether to be "generous" as Justice Brennan would have it, but how to be accurate. See R.
BORK, supra note 1, at 196, 198.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2349 (1989),
provides a detailed illustration of the kinds of inaccuracies that result from interpreting our political
traditions without regard for mute behaviors. His argument is that our traditions have honored the
privacy interests of unmarried putative fathers even where the assertion of their parental interests
would, at least potentially, interfere with established and formalized marriages. The major obstacle to
this argument is the long-established legal rules presuming that paternity lies in the married father.
Brennan answers that the adulterous, putative father's interests have been respected even if not legally
protected. Id. at 2353. This response obviously glosses over the fact that, for the most part, it has not
occurred to people to enact legislation protecting the relationship that they supposedly respect. Bren-
nan also claims that parenthood (including unmarried parents living with their children as informal
families) has in fact received legal protections. Id. at 2350. This claim ignores what is implicit in the
limitations on those protections, insofar as they have not been extended to adulterous relationships.
Finally, he insists that the received tradition of protecting formalized marriage is "crumbling." Id. He
notes, for instance, that in a few jurisdictions, proof of paternity is allowed even as against the child of a
married couple; he thus diverts attention from the large number of jurisdictions that have not changed
their rules, as well as from the fact that even where the rules have begun to change, those changes have
not yet gone so far as to grant parental rights. Compare id. at 2343-44 (plurality opinion by Scalia, J.)
with id. at 2350 (Brennan, dissenting). He also sees the received tradition "crumbling" in that its often-
asserted basis-the need to protect children from illegitimacy-is of decreasing importance due to
changes in the legal and social status of illegitimates. Id. at 2351. In this, Brennan denigrates the
possibility that imperfectly understood or expressed values might underlie the rule. In short, whatever
can be said in favor of Justice Brennan's version of our moral traditions, it cannot be said that he has
identified any pattern of deliberate collective decisions. Indeed, the point of his exercise is to push legal
protections beyond what people have considered, proposed, and enacted.
44. For a brief, useful description and criticism of dialogue theories, see Maltz, The Supreme
Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 CONST. COMM. 375 (1988).
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my discussion. I have been urging that judges should be exposed to
and should be influenced by a great variety of political pressures, that
indeed, they should be influenced even by political inattention and in-
activity. You might be saying that if this is so, judges have an impossi-
bly complicated task; they must pay attention to virtually our whole
political and social history. This is true. It is a consequence, not of
my argument, but of the ambitious moral and political functions
thrust upon and assumed by the modem federal judiciary. I have
treated these functions as givens, as in fact they are as a practical mat-
ter.45 If, in enforcing our Constitution, judges are to establish our val-
ues by interpreting our political history, then judges should interpret
our whole history, not only what has been desired and said but also
what has been accepted and left unspoken.
45. For this reason, it does not matter whether I (or anyone else) disapproves of modem interpre-
tive practices or would prefer a different jurisprudence. It is true that I have argued for a much more
modest judicial role-but one that still utilizes our political traditions as a major basis for interpreta-
tion. See R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (1989). But, preferences aside, it is important to consider the full implications of the
course on which our judges are currently set.
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